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Executive Summary 
 
In the past two decades, two phenomena 
have placed Mizo society under strain – the 
inflow of people from Myanmar and border 
trade. Unfortunately, the authorities’ 
passivity in monitoring these issues, has 
further led to their exacerbation rather than 
their containment.  
 
Mizoram has been hosting temporarily a 
Burmese population – almost entirely from 
Chin state – of 70,000 to 100,000 people, 
who have fled political repression, military 
oppression and economic impasse. To grasp 
the social complexity of the situation, three 
main points are addressed: description, 
categorization, and integration.  
 
The Chins migrate to Mizoram for 
linguistic, cultural and religious proximity 
with the Mizo, as they share a common 
historic and genetic background. The 
difficulties that have cued their migration 
lead them to take up low paid jobs. Thus, 
Chins are found working as maids, 
labourers, coolies and street vendors, and 
often cheated. Some also take part in 
informal border trade and in illegal activities 
– drugs trafficking, theft, liquor brewing – 
that raise ill fame of which they 
subsequently fall victim.  
 
But a closer look at the Burmese in 
Mizoram reveals that a large part of them is 
floating, coming in and out at ease, in search 
of better economic opportunities and 
employment. Hence, except from the 
crossing of an international boundary, their 
migration resembles very much that of 
seasonal migrant workers within India, 
which make it difficult to categorize who is 
a political refugee and who is a migrant. The 
Chins living in Mizoram fall into a judicial 
loophole denying help and protection. The 
Indian Parliament never approved the 
refugee law that was drafted in the late 
1990s. Besides, the UNHCR is not allowed 
by the Government of India to work in the 
Northeast and considers most Chins living 
in Mizoram as economic migrants. Finally, 
the International Labour Organization does 
not have proper protecting laws, nor the 
means to enforce such rules, for 
international migrants.  
 
Based on discussions in Aizawl, the 
Burmese population in Mizoram could be 
classified into two main groups: Refugees on 
the one hand (approximately 50-70 per cent 
of the population) and economic migrants. 
The former can be further subdivided 
between political activists who cannot return 
without facing trouble, and settlers, who 
have fled a miserable life in Myanmar and 
built a new home in Mizoram.  
 
Therefore, the integration of the Chins in 
Mizo society oscillates between rejection, 
solidarity and dependency, along a more or 
less typical pattern, in which the incoming 
population is welcomed as long as it serves 
the locals’ needs – by providing, for 
instance, cheap labour – but becomes a 
nuisance as soon as it challenges local life 
through criminality, cultural, linguistic and 
religious ostentation and expansion. This 
maintains a tension that ends in spurts of 
violence when an occasion comes up, such 
as a crime committed by a migrant on a 
local.  
 
In Mizoram, what differs from the usual 
pattern is that Mizos and Chins are 
ethnically related, winning the Chins a better 
treatment compared to that reserved for the 
Chakmas or Brus. Nevertheless, violence 
regularly erupts, such as in 2003, when the 
Young Mizo Association led a movement to 
drive out the Chins. 
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Another element that strains Mizoram is 
border trade. The border post at 
Zokhawthar in Champhai district was 
inaugurated in 2004 to bring much of the 
existing exchanges into the legal fold. 
However, the 1994 India-Myanmar border 
trade agreement only mentions 22 items that 
can be traded legally, and thus never 
managed to reduce informal trade, which 
includes mainly third country manufactured 
products (from China or Thailand). The 
annual formal trade volume should be 
around Rs. 100,000,000 and the informal 
trade around Rs. 230,000,000.  
 
Three main implications of border trade can 
be identified in Mizoram. First, the influx of 
cheap manufactured goods makes it hard 
for local or Indian goods to compete. 
Second, the enrichment of some Burmese 
traders in informal trade creates jealousy and 
resentment. Third, the influx of narcotics 
and alcohol leads to a moral radicalization 
of society. These implications are visible in 
Aizawl’s main market, Bara Bazaar, and do 
not contribute to the state’s communal 
harmony but rather aggravate tensions.  
 
The passivity of the authorities in 
monitoring both the immigration from 
Myanmar and informal border trade has 
thus done nothing to ease these tensions.  
On the inflow and activity of the Burmese, 
local authorities invoke the difficult terrain 
as well as physical and linguistic similarities 
to justify their non-keeping track of 
immigrants. A system to count the Burmese 
based on the issue of temporary permits 
used to be enforced in Aizawl but has been 
abandoned. As for the monitoring of 
informal border trade, the authorities have 
not shown active and earnest commitment, 
as the Land Customs and the police do not 
admit calculating any estimates of informal 
transactions.  
 
Such passivity can only stir up existing 
tensions between Mizos and Burmese. 
Moreover, drugs could substantially hamper 
the state’s development by spoiling 
Mizoram’s best asset – its educated 
population. On the other hand, 
unmonitored immigration could deteriorate 
Mizoram’s second advantage: its peaceful 
situation, rare in the Northeast. Therefore, 
initiatives to develop the state – such as the 
recently inked Kaladan project – should not 
ignore such issues. 
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Introduction 
 
I gently weep in the hills of Mizoram, 
Thinking about the streets of Yangon, 
The people of Yangon, 
The divided people under a common moon. 
- Rosangliana, a.k.a. ZoRock 
 
When asked about Mizo and Chin’s 
ambiguous relation of brotherhood and 
mistrust, tears flowed down ZoRock’s 
cheeks.1 The Mizo rock legend, in one song 
in particular, conveys a message he holds 
dear of unity for the partitioned Zo land and 
people. However, such is not the general 
feeling towards the large Burmese2 
population present in Mizoram, often 
stereotyped as source of trouble. This 
animosity most spectacularly burst out in 
2003, when a large movement was 
conducted, notably by the Young Mizo 
Association, to drive the Burmese out of 
Mizoram. 
 
Mizos and Chins share the same genetic, 
cultural, historical, and linguistic heritage, as 
they all descend from the Zo people that 
have settled in the Lushai hills some seven 
centuries ago. They also practice the same 
religion since they were converted by 
western Christian missionaries in the late 
19th century. Although now separated by the 
Triau river that delineated the 500 km-long 
Mizoram-Myanmar border, most of the 
tribes in Mizoram and in Chin state 
(Myanmar) would accept the designation of 
people (“mi”) of the hills (“zo” or “zoram”), 
and speak quite similar tibeto-burman 
                                                 
1 Interview with Rosangliana, a.k.a. ZoRock, 
Aizawl, 16 December 2007. 
2 The term “Burmese” is generally used to 
designate a citizen of Myanmar/Burma (one 
sometimes also reads “Myanmarese”), while 
“Burman” describe ethnic Burmans, or Bamar, 
Myanmar’s largest ethnic group (68 percent of the 
population). 
languages. Part of this common heritage are 
the “zawlbuk,” bachelors’ house placed in 
the centre of the village and where young 
boys receive their education, and the 
“Rihdil,” venerated lake located a few 
kilometres east of the border.3 
 
Despite extensive similarities, variants can 
be found throughout Zo land, and are put 
forward when it comes to distinguish Mizos 
from Chins. Differences concern language – 
different accents and dialects, that some call 
different languages –, but also lifestyle – 
eating habits, education.  
 
Today, about 70,000 and maybe up to a 
100,000 Burmese live in Mizoram, as a result 
of oppression led by the Myanmar military 
government since 1962. Fleeing forced 
labour, ethnic persecution, economic 
deadlock and political restrictions, people 
cross the porous border and take refuge in 
Mizoram. However, although hardships cue 
their migration, simply defining Mizoram’s 
Burmese population as refugees appears 
inappropriate. In Aizawl, one could see 
many equally fitting in the category of 
migrant workers. 
 
In addition, (mainly informal) border trade 
has now grown to certain proportions that 
allow some Burmese traders to realize non 
negligible profits. As a source of income 
that attracts people from Myanmar, border 
trade is both an occasion for contact 
between Chins and Mizos and an additional 
point of contention.  
                                                 
3 For an exhaustive description of Mizo society, see 
Lal Pudaite, “Chapter 6 – Mizoram,” in Sub-
Regional Relations in the Eastern South Asia: With 
Special Focus on India's North Eastern Region, 
Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External 
Trade Organization 
(http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Jrp/pdf/jrp_1
33_06.pdf). 
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How can this tension be explained, 
considering that Mizos and Chins are the 
same people, that the Chins’ migration 
results of terrible political and economic 
conditions, and that border trade profits 
both sides of the frontier?  
 
This paper first describes Mizoram’s 
Burmese population and its integration in 
Mizo society. It then examines border trade 
and its implications, with a particular focus 
on Aizawl’s central market, Bara Bazaar, to 
end with the role and attitude of the central 
and state governments in the tensions facing 
Mizoram. 
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Burmese Population in Mizoram 
 
 
Mizoram is inhabited by about 70,000 
people that have come from over the 
border, from neighbouring Chin state4 for a 
large majority of them (more than 98 per 
cent). The campaign of Burmanization5 
launched by military dictator Ne Win in 
1967 cued the Chins’ migration towards 
India, as they felt doubly marginalized. First, 
because of their language, very different 
from Burman (Bamar) spoken by 68 percent 
of Myanmar’s population; and second, 
because of their religion, Christianity. 
Literally driven out of their land, about 
17,000-20,000 Chins fled at the time, 
choosing Mizoram because of geographical, 
cultural, religious and linguistic proximity. 
They were followed by another substantial 
wave of refugees in 1988-1990, when 
Myanmar’s present day military junta, then 
naming itself State Law and Order 
Restoration Council, came into power by 
brutally cracking down on democracy 
protesters. A more diverse population has 
since then been entering Mizoram, including 
the activists of the National League for 
Democracy, in a minor but constant flow.  
 
Among the diverse Burmese coming from 
Myanmar, most Burmans settle temporarily 
in Mizoram, waiting to grab the opportunity 
to reach Delhi and apply for refugee status 
at the UNHCR; from then on, many 
manage to sneak through to a western 
country; the few Burmans remaining, 
perhaps a thousand, work in the weaving 
industry. On the contrary, Chins have 
settled in large numbers throughout 
Mizoram, in urban areas (probably about 40 
per cent of them) and in the countryside (60 
per cent).  
 
                                                 
4 There are three main subdivisions in Chin state: 
Tiddim, Falam, Haka. 
5 Robert A. Holmes, “Burmese Domestic Policy: 
The Politics of Burmanization,” Asian Survey, Vol. 
7, No. 3, March 1967, pp. 188-197. 
Having braved the risk to flee repression 
and economic stagnancy, the Burmese 
staying in Mizoram live a miserable life and 
consequently take up almost any job offered 
to them. Many Burmese men work on daily 
wages as underpaid labourers and coolies, 
getting Rs. 80-100 a day (whereas the 
average would be Rs. 130 for a Mizo). They 
often are cheated on and not paid at all in 
the end.  
 
Almost every middle class household 
employs a Burmese domestic worker for Rs. 
800-1000 a month, much below the salary of 
a Mizo domestic worker (at least Rs. 1500). 
There have been cases of exploitation 
and/or abuse (mental, physical, sexual), 
causing these girls to flee the family that 
employs them and sustain their living by 
drug peddling or prostitution. Some 
Burmese also work in more traditional 
sectors, such as handicrafts making and 
weaving, or farming for those on the 
countryside. 
 
Many Burmese are also involved in illegal 
activities. In absolute terms, Burmese seem 
to commit as many crimes as Mizos. 
However, in comparison to their respective 
total population, this supposes that the 
proportion of Burmese involved in illegal 
activities stands much higher than that of 
Mizos. In drug dealing, it has been 
observed, that while most drug peddlers are 
Mizo, Burmese largely hold the wholesaling 
market, as drugs arrive from the infamous 
Golden Triangle where Myanmar, China 
and Laos meet. As Mizoram’s legislation 
totally prohibits alcohol, liquor brewing is 
illegal. Here, unlike in the drug sector, liquor 
factory owners are almost always Mizos who 
employ Burmese for the low tasks. Finally, 
many Burmese also get caught robbing. 
Pulsar bikes were a popular item to be 
stolen, as their engine can be sold for Rs. 
200,000 in Myanmar to be fitted onto boats.  
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If a probable majority of the Burmese 
population of Mizoram has settled 
permanently, the whole has not, and a large 
floating population, at least a third and 
perhaps up to 50 per cent of Mizoram’s 
total Burmese population, comes and goes 
at ease. Although all Burmese present in 
Mizoram have faced or are facing military 
oppression and economic hardships, it 
seems that a large part of them are migrant 
workers rather than simple refugees, as they 
come to India in search of economic 
opportunities (employment, higher wages, 
entrepreneurial freedom) and regularly go 
back to their relatives – often during 
Christmas. Except for the presence of an 
international border, the situation does not 
differ much from the case of economic 
migrants in the quest for employment 
within India. 
 
Based on field research in Aizawl, Burmese 
population in Mizoram can be classified into 
two main groups: refugees (approximately 
50-70 per cent of the population), and 
economic migrants. The former can be 
further subdivided between the political 
activists who are identified by the Burmese 
authorities and thus cannot return without 
being arrested, and settlers, who have fled a 
miserable life in Myanmar and built a new 
home in Mizoram.  
 
Refugees 
50-70 percent of total population 
Political activists (1000 people 
maximum) 
• among which a core of 50-100 works 
full time to promote democracy in 
Myanmar 
• for all of them, it would be 
dangerous to go back to Myanmar. 
 
Settlers (probably around 40 to 50 
thousand people) 
• have fled hardships, military 
oppression, political repression, 
economic impasse 
• could probably go back permanently 
to Myanmar but have no intention or 
interest in doing so until democracy 
is restored 
• do probably go back occasionally to 
visit friends and family 
• probably send money to relatives 
• for some of them, may have obtained 
a voter’s ID 
• must be settled largely in the 
countryside (60 percent) 
• some of them must take part in cross 
border trade, money exchange, but 
also informal trade 
 
Migrants 
30-50 percent of total population 
• come and go 
• escape or compensate economic 
hardship, repression and lack of 
freedom by seeking a source of 
income in India 
• most of them occupy low paid jobs 
(housemaids, coolies, street vendors) 
• some of them take part in cross 
border trade 
• all of them must benefit from the 
discrepancy between official 
exchange rates and black market 
exchange rates; is this sustaining the 
whole process? 
• we may assume that most crimes 
committed by Burmese are 
committed by Burmese migrants 
rather than by Burmese who have 
settled in Mizoram. 
 
However, it is the international border that 
makes the situation different by placing the 
Burmese immigrants into a judicial 
loophole. The 1951 International 
Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees defines a refugee as a person who, 
“owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable, 
or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country; or 
who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual 
7 
residence as a result of such events, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
return to it.” 
 
Mizoram’s Chins do fall under the above 
definition,6 but a number of them, are 
equally well defined by the International 
Labour Organization’s Thesaurus:7 “A 
person who migrates or who has migrated 
from one country to another with a view to 
being employed other than on his own 
account.” However, no legal norms protect 
migrant workers 
 
The legal void is completed by India’s 
refusal8 to ratify the 1951 Refugee 
Convention or the 1967 additional Protocol. 
Therefore, no international law binds India 
to welcome on its soil either refugees or the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR). Similarly, no national law defines 
the status of refugees.9 As a result, refugees 
entering India come under the legal category 
of illegal immigrants, which does not confer 
them any rights, and the UNHCR operates 
within the limits of the Indian government’s 
goodwill that have always kept it from 
working in India’ Northeast. Not having the 
chance to reach Delhi and obtain refugee 
status, the Burmese living in Mizoram do 
                                                 
6 In spite of which the UNHCR consistently 
maintains that no more than ten per cent of the 
Chins in Mizoram are refugees, while minimum 90 
per cent are economic migrants. 
7 ILO Thesaurus available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ILO-
Thesaurus/english/index.htm.  
8 The main reason explaining this refusal is simply 
that India does not want to be bound by 
supranational laws that challenge its territorial 
sovereignty by forcing it to accept refugees, which 
is quite a logical justification considering that most 
of India’s neighbours experience a conflict of some 
sort. 
9 Florina Benoit, “India: A National Refugee Law 
Would Equalize Protection,” Refugees 
International, 26 August 2004, 
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/articl
e/detail/3227. Also see Arjun Nair, “National 
Refugee law for India,” IPCS Research Paper 11, 
December 2007. 
not enjoy the Rs. 1400 allotted to refugees 
and are subjected to occasional repatriation, 
happening when the Young Mizo 
Association raises its voice against them10. 
 
Integration into Mizo society 
The integration of the Burmese in Mizo 
society oscillates between rejection, 
solidarity and dependency, along a more or 
less typical pattern, in which the incoming 
population is welcomed as long as it serves 
the locals’ needs – by providing, for 
instance, cheap labour – but becomes a 
nuisance as soon as it challenges local life 
through criminality, cultural, linguistic and 
religious ostentation and expansion. This 
maintains a tension that ends in spurts of 
violence when an occasion comes up, such 
as a crime committed by a migrant on a 
local. For example, the Bihari and 
Bangladeshi migrants in Assam and 
Meghalaya, despite being needed for all 
types of labour, are at times subjected to 
violence and rejected by locals. Similar 
phenomena can be observed in Arunachal 
Pradesh with the Chakmas and Hajongs as 
well as with the Bengali presence in Tripura 
and Manipur. 
 
The immediate reaction of Mizos when 
asked about the inflow of Burmese people is 
one of mistrust and rejection that 
emphasizes on the Burmese involvement in 
illegal activities, in particular theft, drug 
peddling, and alcohol brewing. Whether 
Burmese commit more crimes than Mizos 
remains unclear, but they are certainly 
perceived as doing so, and thought to have a 
bad and “unchristian” influence on Mizo 
society, who named them derogatorily 
                                                 
10 “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Burmese 
Chin Refugees in India,” Refugees International, 
22 July 2004, 
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/articl
e/detail/3047; Nicole Mailman and Kavita Shukla, 
“Burmese Refugees in New Delhi: Self-Sufficiency 
Goals Not Being Met,” Refugees International, 6 
June 2006, 
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/articl
e/detail/8743/.  
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“Burma-mi,” meaning simply “Burma 
people.” 
 
The question of alcohol illustrates with 
accuracy the way Mizos believe the Burmese 
presence to be harmful. The Mizoram 
Liquor Total Prohibition Act (MLTP) was 
passed in 1997 under pressure from the 
Church and the Young Mizo Association. 
However, this has not brought down the 
demand for alcohol. All over the state, 
numerous brewing factories have sprung up 
to supply this demand. For example, three 
places in Aizawl, Rangvamual, Phunchhown 
and Turail, are famous for illicit liquor 
brewing. While most workers in breweries 
have been found to be Burmese, property of 
these factories largely lays in Mizo hands.11  
 
Similarly, Mizos often accuse the Burmese 
for the spread of drugs that mar the state.12 
The provenance of drugs, and particularly 
heroin (“Number Four”), is indeed 
Myanmar, and most particularly the 
infamous Golden Triangle on the Myanmar-
Thailand-Laos border. Drug peddling is 
done by locals, while Burmese control the 
wholesale market. This only confirms 
Myanmar as the origin of drugs, but also 
nuances Burmese involvement and 
responsibility in spreading drugs. Because 
drug abuse among Mizo youth has become a 
major problem, a local NGO called the 
Society for Recovering Addicts (SORA) has 
been campaigning against drug abuse by 
promoting music. SORA organized on 31 
August 2007 the first “Addicts’ Day” to 
convey the message that drugs addicts are 
                                                 
11 Many of these factories have however been 
destroyed in 2007 during a campaign led by the 
Young Mizo Association. 2007 had been declared 
the “year against the two evils” by the central 
YMA. 
12 “‘WAR On DRUG’ group threatens Burmese 
immigrants, Mizo Rights activist”, Khonumthung 
News, 14 July 2005, 
http://www.khonumthung.com/kng-news/05-news-
archive/july-2005/war-on-drug-group-threatens-
burmese-immigrants-mizo-rights-activist.  
not leeches sucking the society but can 
contribute to it.13  
In its fight against the two “evils” of alcohol 
and drugs, the Young Mizo Association 
(YMA), a NGO founded in 1935 on the 
model of the Young Men’s Christian 
Association (YMCA), acts as the moral 
guardian of the society.14 The YMA 
originally devoted itself to community work, 
such as cremation ceremonies, an activity 
which has ensured its presence in every 
locality of Mizoram and garnered a wide 
array of supporters that confer legitimacy to 
the organization. It counts more than 
500,000 members, more or less all the Mizo 
youth (YMA has a very large understanding 
of youth: between 12 and 45). The YMA’s 
networking base also exceeds Mizoram to 
other states of Northeast India. Its 
proximity with the Church and the 
authorities has endowed it with considerable 
power and influence.  Consequently, it 
provides assistance to various government 
projects and supervises electoral rolls for the 
state. 
 
This gives the YMA a substantial say in the 
integration of the Burmese into the Mizo 
society, as getting registered on electoral 
rolls is the first step for illegal migrants to 
acquire Indian citizenship. Having lived in 
Mizoram for years and established extended 
contacts with locals, some Burmese have 
been able obtain a voters’ registration, and, 
later on, citizenship.15 Other ways include 
obtaining ration cards or enrolling in the 
army to blur one’s origin. Political parties 
are often associated in this process, as they 
                                                 
13 Interview with David Zothanpuia, founder of 
SORA, and other members of SORA Family, 
Aizawl, 15 December 2007; and “SORA prepares 
for Addicts Day”, Aizol Times, 13 August 2007. 
14 The organization evolved out of the traditional 
young men dormitory, or “Zawlbuk,” later became 
the Young Lushai Association and then ultimately 
the Young Mizo Association. It aimed at leading 
the Mizo society and youth on to a good Christian 
path. 
15 Interview with R. Thanga, Registrar of the 
Mizoram Bench of the Guwahati High Court and 
member of Mizoram Human Rights’ Committee.  
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have no scruple facilitating registration of 
illegal Burmese immigrants in order to win 
votes. For example, the Congress Party tries 
to lure the Burmese by offering them voters’ 
registration because the party believes most 
of them support the Mizo National Front 
(MNF). The local YMA branches therefore 
keep a strict vigil on the electoral rolls 
revision process and bring up objections if 
they find any Burmese trying to register as 
voters in the state.  
 
But the YMA’s approach often goes much 
too far against the Burmese population,16 
attracting critics from the press. In July 
2003, a rape case, commonly called the 
Vancy Hotel case,17 of a minor Mizo girl by 
a Burmese brought to the fore hatred and 
distrust between the two communities. The 
girl happened to be the granddaughter of a 
prominent political leader, while the rapist’s 
sister ran a well established hotel in Aizawl 
named the Vancy Hotel, where the crime 
took place. Clashes broke out almost 
instantaneously and the Burmese 
community was attacked by local Mizo 
youth all over Aizawl. The YMA issued a 
general order for the Burmese to leave 
Mizoram. Houses were checked and 
whoever was suspected of being Burmese 
was ordered out of Aizawl. People began 
amassing at the border town of Champhai 
but their fear of capture by the Tatmadaw 
(Burmese army) prevented them from going 
further. Ultimately the volatile situation was 
resolved by the intervention of Church 
leaders, district administration personnel 
with the YMA which later withdrew its 
threat order. People describe this episode as 
one of the darkest in Mizo-Burmese 
                                                 
16 “Assessment Report On Burmese Refugees In 
Mizoram And Delhi,” Chin Human Rights 
Organization, June 2004, 
http://eng.chro.org/index.php?option=com_content
&task=view&id=126&Itemid=23.  
17 See “How to treat the Burmese in Mizoram” and 
“Let the illegal people leave!,” Rhododendron, Vol. 
VII, No. 2, Chin Human Rights Organization, 9 
March 2004, 
http://eng.chro.org/index.php?option=com_content
&task=view&id=42&Itemid=15.  
relations in Mizoram. Some say such an 
event could have been predicted amidst the 
general feeling of discontent among Mizo 
society against the Burmese living in 
Mizoram.  
 
However, the stereotypes targeting 
Mizoram’s Burmese population are often 
counterbalanced by invoking solidarity and 
brotherhood based on ethnicity and religion. 
All in Mizoram recognize the Chins and the 
Mizo’s common lineage, history and culture 
that, according to many, should supersede a 
narrow-minded attitude of rejection towards 
the Burmese living in Mizoram. 
 
The strongest symbol of Zo identity is 
certainly the great lake known as “Rihdil,” 
located in Myanmar, and in which people in 
Mizoram and Chin state take immense 
pride. Mizos often say with irony that the 
largest lake in Mizoram lies outside of the 
state! The traditional belief goes that the 
soul of a Zo leaves earth through this lake 
to reach heaven. Therefore it is said that 
even if a Mizo has never visited Myanmar, 
his or her soul will have to ultimately travel 
over the border after death in order to attain 
salvation. 
 
Within the larger Zo identity, we have been 
pointed out that differences exist between 
people on each side of the border, especially 
in their accent or language as well as food 
habits. It is quite understandable that people 
of a same population being cut in two for 
sixty years would evolve differently. Though 
not infallible hints, these small differences 
make it possible for local Mizos to 
determine whether a person has come from 
Myanmar or not, a distinction that physical 
features do not allow. Language proximity 
seems greater than dissimilarities, as the 
Burmese seem to quickly pick up the local 
accent. 
 
Such reinforced sub-national identities 
undermine the sense of solidarity that 
Burmese activists in Aizawl try to promote. 
Nevertheless, Suan Tung Parte, Aizawl’s 
most prominent Burmese activist, explained 
 10 
that the YMA’s attitude has changed in the 
past year, and that it is now widely 
understood (although it may not be the first 
impulsive reaction) that the solution to the 
Burmese presence in Mizoram lies in 
political change in Myanmar. On 2 October 
2007, a march for democracy in Myanmar 
was organized in Aizawl and joined by most 
political parties’ leaders.18 On this occasion, 
Burmese activists, the Editor-in-Chief of the 
Aizol Times, as well as the YMA president 
delivered speeches.  
 
The Burmese living in Mizoram and Mizos 
also share the same religion, Christianity.  
Thus, in addition to ethnic brotherhood, 
Chins and Mizos view each other as 
brothers in religion, despite the fact that the 
Chins have their separate Methodist Church 
service.  This factor contributes to 
maintaining a Burmese population in 
Mizoram because it upholds the tolerance 
level of the Mizo society towards them as 
they are encouraged to follow a good 
Christian life.  
 
Comparing Mizos’ attitude towards the 
Chins and towards other communities that 
have migrated to Mizoram highlights this 
ethnic and Christian solidarity. The Bru and 
the Chakma communities, present in 
dwindling numbers in Lunglei, Lawngtlai 
and Mamit districts, do not get the same 
kind of support and sympathy from the 
Mizo society. They are seen as a direct threat 
to Mizo identity, emanating from their 
demands for Union territory status for their 
respective areas of influence in these three 
districts of Mizoram. Similarly, Mizos resent 
Bangladeshi migrants constantly growing in 
number, and migrants from mainland India 
are seen as outsiders not welcome in the 
state. This resentment is not visible when it 
comes to the Chin population, considered 
part of the Zo people.   
 
                                                 
18 “Thousands rally in Northeast India in solidarity 
with monks in Burma”, Mizzima News, 2 October 
2007. 
The preferential treatment that Mizos grant 
Chins also appears in the question of border 
fencing. While the border with Bangladesh 
has been fenced where Chakmas and Brus 
intrude into Mizoram, and that the rest of it 
is in the process of being fenced to prevent 
from further influx of Bangladeshi 
migrants,19 fencing the Burmese border 
would face strong resistance by both the 
state government and the people of 
Mizoram.  
 
But in the end, the Manichean dichotomy of 
rejection and solidarity has already lost its 
relevance, as many realize how dependent 
on the Burmese population Mizoram has 
grown over years of Burmese presence.  As 
cheap and enterprising labourers or 
domestic workers, they contribute 
significantly to the Mizoram economy. 
Some Mizos even jokingly say that they have 
turned so dependent on Burmese labour 
that they themselves have become lazy! 
Mizos may accuse the Burmese to come 
make profits or to disloyally compete with 
local labourers by accepting underpaid work, 
but should not ignore their own 
responsibility in exploiting this cheap 
labour. Although many consider that they 
cannot be trusted, Mizos keep employing 
Burmese young women as maids, which can 
only attract more domestic workers from 
over the border 
 
                                                 
19 Interview with the Deputy Secretary, Home, 
Government of Mizoram, Aizawl, 12 December 
2007. 
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Border Trade 
 
Walking down the streets of Aizawl, one 
cannot ignore the vast number of street 
vendors, displaying toys, DVDs, clothes, 
food, inscribed with Chinese characters or 
peculiar Burmese round letters. Sitting at 
night in Bara Bazaar, an inquisitive but 
prudent lady pointed at a sports bag and 
tried to sell us some clothes, “good quality, 
from Thailand, China.” A few days later, 
when leaving Aizawl, our bus companions 
going back to Guwahati or mainland India - 
all carried cardboard boxes, full of Chinese 
goods. These examples show the state of 
Mizoram’s border trade with Myanmar 
which renders Thai and Chinese items 
available all over the markets of Aizawl. 
Border trade has now become an essential 
feature of Mizoram’s economy. 
 
But this phenomenon is quite recent, as 
border trade officially commenced in 2004. 
In 1986, the Memorandum of Settlement 
that consecrated Mizoram as a new state of 
India contained the following clause: 
“Border trade in local produced or grown 
agriculture commodities could be allowed 
under a scheme to be formulated by the 
central government, subject to international 
arrangement with neighbouring Countries.” 
On 21 January 1994,  India and Myanmar 
signed the agreement officializing border 
trade. However, it took ten more years for 
the border trade point to be opened at 
Zokhawthar20 in the district of Champhai, 
where a bridge had already been built in 
2002 across the river Triau that delineates 
the border. In September 2007, a Land 
Customs composite building that includes 
telecom, bank, post, immigration, and 
security offices was finalised and handed 
over to the Trade and Commerce 
Department.   
                                                 
20 The border trade point was inaugurated on 30 
January 2004 by the Commerce Minister of 
Myanmar Pye Sone and the acting Chief Minister 
of Mizoram Shri Tawnluia. 
Volume of Trade: The volume of border 
trade is particularly difficult to assert. Paul S. 
Songate21 establishes that on 2 June 2007, 
Rs. 283,500 worth of urea (fertilizer), in 630 
bags and 11 vehicles, was exported to 
Myanmar (only one more vehicle crossed 
the border that day, carrying goods). If one 
accepts this figure and assumes that trade 
goes at the same pace 300 days a year, then 
Mizoram exports Rs. 85,050,000 of urea per 
year through Zokhawthar, not even 0.4 
percent of Mizoram’s GDP in 2002-2003.22   
 
According to some Burmese refugees in 
Aizawl, legal trade represents only 30 
percent of total exchanges. Let’s assume that 
total official trade amounts to Rs. 
100,000,000, which would mean that about 
Rs. 230,000,000 worth of merchandise is 
traded yearly on an informal basis, between 
Mizoram and Myanmar, for a total volume 
of Rs. 330,000,000. 
 
From April 2006 to March 2007, the Land 
Customs at Zokhawthar have seized Rs. 
7,308,091 worth of goods coming in and Rs. 
2,792,700 worth coming out of Mizoram.23 
Though a small fraction of the actual 
informal trade, these figures show 
nevertheless the discrepancy between 
incoming and outgoing trade – a reflection 
of India’s general trade deficit.  
                                                 
21 Paul S. Songate, Indo-Myanmar Border Trade – 
Socio-Economic and Political Dynamics in 
Mizoram, paper presented at the National Seminar 
on “Peace and Development in Mizoram: The role 
of State and Civil Society” organised by the 
Deparment of Political Science, Mizoram 
University, on 2-3 November 2007 in Aizawl, 
Mizoram. 
22 Rs. 21,931,300,000. These are the most recent 
statistics compiled and made available by the 
Department of Economics and Statistics, 
Government of Mizoram (http://desmizo.nic.in/). 
23 M.P Bezbaruah, “Indo-Myanmar Border Trade: 
The Stakes for North-East India,” Dialogue, July-
September 2007, Volume 9 No. 1 
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Content: The 21 January 1994 agreement 
allows for 22 items24 to be traded legally, 
largely locally produced agricultural goods. 
In this regard, the legislation fits in the 
traditional trade system of the Lushai hills, 
in which people relied on two parallel 
economies: one internal subsistence 
economic system, based on agriculture and 
to a limited extent on hunting and fishing; 
and one external economic system 
consisting of trade with people down in the 
plains.25  
 
The same pattern is followed today, in 
which goods made in India or Myanmar can 
legally be traded, while products 
manufactured in a third country compose 
the informal trade, as has been pointed out 
by M. P. Bezbaruah.26 Indeed, textiles (from 
Thailand and China) represent about 40 
percent of Mizoram’s informal imports, and 
electrical and electronic items almost 17 
percent.27 Livestock (mostly pigs) constitutes 
more than a quarter of informal imports; the 
informal exchange of pigs has probably 
come up since the import of all domestic 
animals was banned in March 2006 because 
of an Avian Flu case reported in Mandalay.  
 
                                                 
24 Exchangeable items are the following: 
“mustard/rape seed; pulses and beans; fresh 
vegetables; fruits; garlic; onion; chillies; spices 
(excluding nut meg, mace, cassia and cloves); 
bamboo; minor forest products excluding teak; 
betel nuts and leaves; food items for local 
consumption; tobacco; tomato; reed broom; 
sesame; sesin; coriander seeds; soyabean; roasted 
sunflower seeds; katha; ginger; any other 
commodities as may be mutually agreed.” 
25 Franck M. Lebar and John K. Musgrave, Ethnic 
Groups of Mainland Southeast Asia, 1964, Human 
Relations Area Files Press, New Heaven, p. 49-55, 
cited in Julie Baujard, La Communaute Chin de 
New Delhi, Universite de Province, September 
2001. 
26 M. P. Bezbaruah, op. cit. 
27 Ibid. 
Trading community: According to a Chin 
National Council representative,28 Chins 
control 90 percent of the border trade, and 
the whole trading community amounts to a 
maximum of 5000 people. If the goods 
cross the border legally, traders cannot do 
so, forcing the goods to be transferred from 
a truck to another at the border. Coming 
from Myanmar, carriers are first unloaded 
on the Myanmar side by mutias29 and then 
reloaded on Indian trucks that are driven to 
the Importers-Exporters Syndicate in 
Zokhawthar. Trucks crossing the border 
come back within an hour. Therefore, the 
traders who cross the border do not do it 
legally. While traders remain in Myanmar, 
their representatives proceed to a door to 
door retailing system that allows people to 
buy or order the exact product they need 
from over the border. Besides, people 
commonly still barter goods in the border 
areas; for example, a tube of toothpaste 
bought in Aizawl for less than Rs. 20 can be 
bartered for a 15L mustard oil tin full of 
rice.  
 
The transportation system is largely based 
on trust. On the Myanmar side, transporters 
are all Burmese. But in Mizoram, only 40 
percent of them are Mizo and the rest are 
Chin.30 Counting a little less than 2000 
inhabitants31 of which 80 percent are 
Burmese, Zokhawthar, has transformed into 
a bustling little town shaped by border trade. 
But trade suffers from the conflict between 
the Champhai Transport Union (CTU) and 
Zokhawthar Welfare Committee (ZWC). 
CTU used to contribute a Rs. 10,000 per 
month for the development of schools in 
Zokawthar. But, because of the growth of 
                                                 
28 Interview with Thanglen Piang, Chin National 
Council representative in Aizawl, 17 December 
2007 
29 Coolies. According to Paul S. Songate, there are 
28 mutias in Zokhawthar who earn each about Rs. 
350 a day by unloading and reloading 7 vehicles. 
30 Interview with Thanglen Piang, Chin National 
Council representative in Aizawl, 17 December 
2007. 
31 Paul S. Songate, op. cit. 
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the town, the ZWC has started asking for 
Rs. 30,000 a month and has expressed the 
demand that the CTU pays the debt of 
Zokhawthar’s schools, or Rs. 80,000. 
Zokhawthar’s transporters’ bitterness lies in 
the monopoly that the CTU enjoys on 
transportation of goods from Zokhawthar 
to Champhai. Zokhawthar’s transporters are 
not allowed to carry goods beyond their 
town. This quarrel bears responsibility for 
the closing of trade between Mizoram and 
Myanmar issued by the Champhai District 
Council on 19 November 2007. The ban 
was lifted in mid-December, after 
intervention of the Champhai District 
Commissioner and the Champhai YMA.32 
 
Apart from the Champhai-Zokhawthar 
route which absorbs most of the trade, 
goods are also carried over to and from 
Myanmar on numerous other points: Zo Te, 
Vaphai and Tlangsam in Champhai district; 
Para, Hlung Mang, Chapui-Matupi (an 
illegally constructed road recently destroyed 
on the Myanmar side under orders by the 
military), Sangau-Lungler, but also a 
waterway down the Kaladan river, all link 
Mizoram’s Saiha district to Southern Chin 
state in Myanmar. 
 
Dual currency exchange system and 
hawala: As inflation is rampant in Myanmar 
(estimated around 40 per cent in 2007), 
Burmese need to secure their assets in gold 
or stable currencies such as dollars. Just like 
exporting provides a country with foreign 
currency, border trade is the opportunity for 
many Burmese to obtain money that does 
not depreciate by the day. This 
phenomenon is accentuated by the 
overvaluation of Kyats by the military 
government that turned the Burmese 
economy into a dual-currency system in 
which Kyats and dollars coexist. 
The official rate for a hundred Indian rupees 
is 95 Kyats. However, in the black market, 
the same amount of rupees can be traded 
against as much as 2700-3000 Kyats on the 
                                                 
32 The Sentinel, Guwahati, 18 December 2007. 
border.33 The exchange black market will get 
you about 31 times what the official 
exchange market offers; in other words, the 
Kyat to the rupee is officially about 31 times 
overvalued. The same profitable circuit can 
be reproduced including the dollar. Ten 
thousand Indian rupees can easily be 
changed against 240-250 dollars on the 
black market (at a rate of 40-41.7 rupees to a 
dollar), that can then be converted into 
Kyats at a rate fluctuating around 1200-1400 
Kyats per dollar (very far from the official 
490 Kyats to a dollar).  
 
This dual currency exchange rate system 
dissuades traders from employing official 
channels.34 In his paper, M. P. Bezbaruah 
also explains that “the existing border trade 
mechanism of formal Indo-Myanmar border 
trade is akin to barter trade in the sense that 
export from one country needs to be 
balanced by import to that country by 
individual trader.” 
 
Therefore, informal border trade comes as a 
solution to these disincentives. Traders send 
border trade profits made in Mizoram 
through unofficial means, such as the 
hawala system, an informal remittance 
system based on trust often used by migrant 
workers. Under the very efficient hawala 
system, a Burmese trader in Aizawl only 
needs to give the money he wants to send to 
Yangon to the hawaladar, who, against a 
commission, ensures that his counterpart in 
Yangon will hand the money to the 
beneficiaries. Only a phone call is required 
and as hawaladars keep track of their debts 
rather than their deposits (or depositors), 
the Burmese trader whose profits emanate 
from informal border trade avoids the risks 
of official channels.35 
                                                 
33 In December 2007. 
34 M. P. Bezbaruah, ibid. 
35 For a detailed study of the hawala system, see 
Patrick M. Jost and Harjit Singh Sandhu, The 
hawala alternative remittance system and its role 
in money laundering, Interpol General Secretariat, 
Lyon, 2000 
(http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/Mo
neyLaundering/hawala/default.asp).  
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Implications of Border Trade 
Border trade between Mizoram and 
Myanmar has various and wide ranging 
implications in Mizoram, on the local Mizo 
population and the migrant Burmese 
population living in Mizoram, as well as on 
the local economy. These implications are 
economic, social and political in nature – 
although these aspects are closely 
interwoven – and largely due to informal 
border trade, as it is much more significant 
in volume than formal border trade. The 
goods being imported informally should be 
divided between consumer goods on the 
one hand, and, on the other hand, arms, 
narcotics, and chemicals used for brewing 
alcohol.  
 
Consumer goods being mainly dispatched to 
urban areas, implications of informal border 
trade can mainly be felt in Aizawl. The 
border towns of Champhai and Vaphai also 
experience impacts in their respective local 
markets, as they act as major transit points 
to Aizawl.36 Informal border trade 
influences neighbouring states, in Assam 
where the busy commercial centre of Silchar 
both depends and supports this large 
informal border trade network.37  
 
The implications of informal border trade in 
arms, narcotics, and chemicals used for 
brewing alcohol are far more scattered out. 
The transit points being Champhai and 
Vaphai, these arms and narcotics reach 
Aizawl, and are then sent further through 
many other routes in Assam and Nagaland. 
The arms and narcotics in Mizoram cater to 
busy and profitable transit routes such as 
Aizawl-Silchar-Bangladesh, Aizawl-Silchar-
Guwahati and Aizawl-Silchar-Dimapur, 
where they are further traded to Nepal, 
                                                 
36 Interview with Lallianchhunga, Lecturer, 
Department of Political Science, Mizoram 
University, Aizawl, 13 December 2007. 
37 Interview with R.Thanga, Registrar of the 
Mizoram Bench of the Guwahati High Court and 
Member of the Mizoram Human Rights 
Committee, Aizawl, 12 December 2007. 
Bhutan and mainland India, but also locally 
consumed. These routes are a central 
component of the narco-terrorism network 
funding various insurgent groups of 
Northeast India. Chemicals used for liquor 
brewing are transported from Myanmar to 
large scale illicit alcohol brewing areas such 
as Rangvamual and Phunchhown in Aizawl 
district, or Silchar, which acts as a hub, 
supplying Assam as well as Mizoram and 
Nagaland, where alcohol is prohibited. 
Implications of informal border trade can be 
summed up in three couplets of cause to 
consequence.  
 
Influx of cheap goods and difficulties for 
local goods: The major implication of the 
informal border trade is the influx of cheap 
consumer goods from China, Thailand and 
Myanmar to the local markets, which makes 
it hard for the local and the Indian goods to 
compete. The reason why local and Indian 
goods find it hard to compete can be found 
in the protectionism offered by the 
government to Indian businesses through 
subsidies or tariff barriers. Therefore there is 
no incentive for these local or Indian 
manufacturers to produce cheaper and 
better goods.  
 
Enrichment of Burmese Traders – 
Jealousy and resentment: Because 
informal trade provides competitive goods 
that are in high demand, some Burmese 
traders register considerable profits. This 
translates into jealousy in the Mizo society 
against the Burmese traders, criticized as 
profiteers. Apart from consumer goods, the 
involvement of Burmese in narcotics and 
alcohol trade generates profits that equally 
fuel resentment.38 The Mizo society views 
the Burmese businesses and profits as 
illegitimate, thereby amounting to animosity 
between the two communities. 
 
Influx of narcotics and alcohol – Moral 
radicalization: The influx of drugs and 
alcohol from Myanmar leads to moral 
radicalization in the Mizo society. Many 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
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Mizos qualify drugs and alcohol as immoral 
and “unchristian,” throwing all 
responsibility on the Burmese for their 
spread and consumption.39 These prejudices 
result in greater communalization between 
the two communities and favor the growth 
in power and influence of reactionary 
activist organizations like the YMA,40 
translating into knee-jerk reactions of 
violence against Burmese migrants when a 
pretext comes up. 
 
Bara Bazaar: A Case Study 
Bara Bazaar, Aizawl’s central market, is a 
bustling centre of commercial activity in the 
heart of Aizawl, where most of the goods 
from the informal border trade end up. This 
small area is an interesting case study to 
assess the socio-economic impact of the 
border trade on the local economy, on the 
Mizo society, on the Burmese migrant 
community, and on their interrelations. 
These complex socio-economic dynamics as 
well as the implications arising out of border 
trade are seen every day in Bara Bazaar.41 
 
There are numerous players in the market. 
Big businessmen, generally wholesalers and 
big retailers, mostly belong to the Mizo 
community, while wealthy Burmese traders 
are only a few. Among small retailers and 
shopkeepers, there is a greater number of 
Burmese, but the majority is still Mizo. 
Street vendors are mainly Burmese. Whereas 
transport companies are mostly owned by 
Mizos, the truck drivers are a mix of Mizos 
and Burmese. Finally, coolies are a mix of 
Mizos, Burmese migrants, Bangladeshis and 
migrants from other parts of India – from 
Northeast India, Silchar in Assam for 
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
40 Interview with Lalruatkima, Assistant Secretary, 
Central Young Mizo Association, Aizawl, 17 
December 2007. 
41 Visits by researchers to Bara Bazaar, Aizawl, 11 
December to 17 December 2007. 
example, as well as mainland India, like 
Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.42 
 
Burmese labour migrants, coming to 
Mizoram in search of a job, should be 
distinguished from Burmese trading 
migrants, who are personally involved in 
informal border trade. Some of the labour 
migrants are indirectly linked with border 
trade, while some others’ activity has 
nothing to do with border trade (for 
example, a domestic worker). Bara Bazaar is 
an area where both types meet. According 
to various estimates, about ten per cent of 
the Burmese migrant community in Aizawl 
is directly connected with the informal 
border trade and another 20-30 per cent of 
them are connected indirectly with the 
dynamics of border trade.  
 
The Burmese migrants’ involvement may 
sound marginal, but they still constitute an 
influential presence in Bara Bazaar. Due to 
the high demand of the cheap goods they 
supply and the informal nature of their 
activity, certain Burmese-owned businesses 
register large output and profits. Operating 
on their own or working in conjuncture with 
Mizo businessmen, Burmese traders 
compete strongly with local businesses and 
have a lot of influence as they become very 
prosperous.43  
 
Burmese coolies in Bara Bazaar are often 
preferred over Mizo coolies as they prove to 
be more enterprising and work for lower 
wages. Moreover, in a sense of community, 
Burmese traders tend to favor Burmese 
coolies. This strong sense of community 
generates animosity, since it gives Burmese 
traders a competitive advantage compared 
to other. The Burmese coolies and other 
economic migrants connected to border 
                                                 
42 Random interactions in Bara Bazaar area by 
researchers, Aizawl, 11 December-17 December 
2007. 
43 Interview with R.Thanga, Registrar of the 
Mizoram Bench of the Guwahati High Court and 
Member of the Mizoram Human Rights 
Committee, Aizawl, 12 December 2007. 
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trade in Bara Bazaar have their own trade 
and labour associations – corporatist 
organizations which divide them further 
from Mizos. They do not intermingle much, 
thereby creating separate communities in the 
society.44 This social tension is not translated 
into much visible animosity but nonetheless 
fuels a certain resentment.  
 
In addition, Burmese migrants often help 
more people from Myanmar come in to 
Mizoram, thereby enlarging their 
community in the market and aggravating 
competition with Mizos or other migrants. 
Burmese migrants come in direct clash with 
economic migrant workers from Assam as 
well as from Bihar or Uttar Pradesh. The 
Burmese community in Bara Bazaar works 
collectively towards making the dynamics of 
the informal border trade more profitable 
for itself. 
 
Although working as a tightly knit 
community gives the Burmese an advantage, 
business sometimes dictates cooperation 
between Mizos and Burmese. Both 
communities realize the interdependence of 
their business activities, whether in border 
trade or in markets such as Bara Bazaar. 
Interdependence implies that interaction 
takes place between the two communities. 
Indeed, we have heard of some wealthy 
Burmese businessmen wedding local Mizo 
girls. However, as intermarrying facilitates 
the settlement and integration of the 
Burmese person, it also becomes a platform 
to help more relatives enter Mizoram and 
then try to legalize their stay by registering 
the whole family during electoral rolls 
revision.45 Thus the money earned in the 
informal border trade supports the inflow of 
Burmese people in Mizoram, a question that 
should be of concern to both the central 
and state governments.  
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
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Government Responses 
The attitude of the state government with 
regard to informal border trade and the 
Burmese living in Mizoram also needs to be 
examined. Our experience led us to 
conclude that the authorities generally adopt 
a passive stance towards informal border 
trade instead of actively trying to tackle the 
issue. Therefore, it appears that the fight 
against informal border trade by the state 
government is not fully earnest, and one can 
sense a conspiracy of silence in addressing 
certain issues relating to the influx and 
presence of Burmese migrants and the 
overall informal nature of the border trade. 
What could be the reasons for such 
passivity?  
 
The state government provides no official 
assessment of the overall presence of 
Burmese migrants in the state and tends to 
underassess their total strength in Mizoram. 
When asked, officials maintain that given 
the difficult terrain and the physical and 
linguistic resemblance, it is practically 
impossible to monitor the flow of Burmese 
migrants at the border.46 There seems to be 
no particular effort or urgency in tackling 
the social animosity expressed towards the 
Burmese, despite the government’s 
capability to conduct such an exercise.  
During an interview,47 the Superintendent of 
Police of Aizawl district, Mr. L T Hrangchal, 
invoked the larger Zo identity and the ethnic 
similarity of the Mizo and the Chins as a 
reason for the authorities’ passive attitude. 
The officer maintained that this voluntary 
ignorance is done by the police on 
humanitarian grounds, considering the 
circumstances in which the Burmese come 
to Mizoram. He also invoked the lack of 
policing infrastructure and manpower to 
conduct frequent checks both in Aizawl and 
                                                 
46 Interview with the Deputy Secretary, Home, 
Government of Mizoram, Aizawl, 12 December 
2007. 
47 Interview with L T Hrangchal, Superintendent of 
Police, Aizawl district, Aizawl, 12 December 2007. 
in the border areas. Nevertheless, he 
mentioned about a method of determining 
the number of Burmese migrants in Aizawl 
which was carried out by his department in 
the past – on the basis of temporary permits 
issued to them. But this was subsequently 
discontinued. Today, as no registration 
system exists, the Burmese living in 
Mizoram can freely come and go.  
 
The crimes committed by the Burmese are 
often ignored and the large scale illicit liquor 
brewing activity is also given the pass. Many 
people drive down from Aizawl every 
evening to the two villages Ranguamual and 
Phunchhown to purchase illicit liquor where 
mainly Burmese migrants are involved in 
liquor brewing, and this continues unabated 
even in the face of the MLTP Act.48  
 
The police administration in Aizawl does 
sometimes arrest Burmese migrants who are 
involved in illegal activities and try to deport 
them to Myanmar. But as no order compels 
them to hand the Burmese to the Myanmar 
authorities, they simply drop them off at the 
border. Most of these deportees manage to 
return to their activities in Mizoram soon 
after. The joke goes that when the Aizawl 
police transport Burmese migrants in jeeps 
or buses to the border at Zokhawthar, the 
migrants manage to return to Aizawl faster 
than the police.49 When asked this question, 
the Superintendent of Police in Aizawl 
replied that the police did not even have 
enough jeeps and other vehicles to conduct 
this activity, forcing them to rely on public 
transport.50 
 
The state government acts with similar 
nonchalance when it comes to border trade. 
                                                 
48 Interview with Angela Chralte, Centre for Peace 
and Development, Aizawl, 16 December 2007. 
49 Interview with David Thangliana, Editor, Aizol 
Times, Aizawl, 16 December 2007. 
50 Interview with L T Hrangchal, Superintendent of 
Police, Aizawl district, Aizawl, 12 December 2007. 
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Apart from the lack of proper infrastructure, 
officials also invoke the role of the central 
government and central customs 
department in the entire border trade issue. 
True, a large informal border trade creates a 
loss in revenue to the state exchequer, but 
on an individual basis, corrupt politicians 
and officials do stand to gain from this 
informal trade structure through payoffs.  
Suggesting a sense of large scale corruption 
in the state government machinery, the 
Director of Trade and Commerce in Aizawl 
was very uncooperative and evasive about 
informal border trade, when approached 
with a questionnaire on border trade.51 He 
denied any role of the state government in 
border trade and maintained that it did not 
keep any records, despite having the duty to 
do so.  
 
The central government also has a crucial 
role to play in the overall informal border 
trade issue in Mizoram. Border trade falling 
under the competences of the central 
government, the centre should provide 
adequate manpower and resources to the 
state government in order to make it 
effective in regulating and checking the flow 
of informal trade in the border. This has 
been the complaint of many state 
governments in the Northeastern region. 
The Indian government is not at all in 
control of such commercial activity at its 
frontiers and it should seriously introspect 
in this matter.52  
 
The central government should take 
adequate steps in border trade policy in the 
Northeast and in Mizoram in particular. 
This involves developing regulating 
infrastructure, as well as enlarging the basket 
                                                 
51 Interview with Director, Directorate of Trade and 
Commerce, Government of Mizoram, Aizawl, 17 
December 2007. 
52 An excellent example is the Moreh border post in 
neighbouring Manipur where goods from across 
the border are in tremendous demand and literally 
flood the market while Indian goods have no 
chance to withstand any competition. The central 
customs is also facing infrastructure crunch in the 
frontier states. 
of goods allowed to be officially traded so 
that it could at least offset the flow of 
informal goods exchanged at the border. 
Hopefully, the integrated checkposts that 
the government is setting up will respond to 
that challenge.53  
                                                 
53 For more information on integrated checkposts, 
see the website of the Ministry of Home Affairs 
(http://mha.gov.in/BM_Div/BM_IntCheck(E).pdf).  
  
.   
Conclusions 
Substantial inflow of Burmese migrants and 
the development of border trade have put 
strain on Mizoram’s society, confronted 
with the difficult question of accepting a 
population that once was it own but has 
grown to be different.  
 
Because Chins are Mizos’ brethren and 
because they run away from a miserable life, 
Mizos’ treatment of Chins incomparably 
outdoes that of other intruding groups. 
However, Mizos have grown wary of 
hosting temporarily for over 20 years a 
population that often creates trouble, or is at 
least seen as such. Some say: “Chins are our 
brothers, but a criminal Chin is not.” People 
now worry about a temporary situation 
turned permanent: “After spending years in 
Mizoram, will they go back if democracy is 
restored in Myanmar?” 
 
In any case, border trade is bound to 
flourish, formal or not. Therefore, the 
central and state governments should 
promote, ensure and monitor an all-
inclusive development of the region through 
border trade, but also appease the tensions it 
engenders. Bringing peace and prosperity 
implies greater mobility and interaction of 
Mizos with their close neighbour, to fulfill 
ZoRock’s dream of unity and brotherhood
.   
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